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AcT-Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
FOUND LIABLE IN PRIVATE CIVIL ACTION UNDER SECTION

OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE

Early in 1966 Douglas Aircraft Company undertook a corporate refinancing program. The investment banking department
of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (Merrill Lynch) acted
as Douglas' agent in the calling and retiring of approximately
$28 million of outstanding debentures' and the underwriting of
$75 million of new convertible subordinated debentures. 2 The
economic outlook for Douglas looked promising during the beginning of the year, and on June 7, Douglas publicly announced
earnings of $.85 per share of common stock for the first five
months of its 1966 fiscal year.3 Douglas' economic condition during
the second quarter of the fiscal year, however, began to deteriorate. On June 22 it was determined that a substantial inventory
write-down was required and the estimated six-month earnings
figure was revised down to $.12 per share. 4 At that point Douglas'
president ordered a press release prepared relating to the declining earnings. This release was issued in time to be made public
before the opening of the New York Stock Exchange on June 24.'
Prior to the issuance of the press release on the twenty-fourth,
Douglas notified Merrill Lynch, as prospective corporate underwriter, of the lower earnings for the first six months of 1966, the
gloomy profit picture for the entire year and a significantly reduced projection of earnings for 1967.6 This information was subsequently passed along to Merrill Lynch salesmen. 7 Between June
20 and June 24 those salesmen disclosed the adverse information
concerning the financial condition of Douglas to certain preferred
Merrill Lynch customers, most of whom were institutional
Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp. 42, 43 (D.
Colo. 1970), rev'd, 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
2 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir.
1974).
3 Id.
" Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 516 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
5 Id. at 516-17.
6 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 232 (2d Cir.
1974).
7 Id.
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investors.8 Between June 20 and June 23 those customers either
sold from present positions or effected short sales 9 in excess of
165,000 shares of Douglas common stock.1 0
On June 23 and 24 the five plaintiffs to this action purchased
Douglas common stock on the New York Stock Exchange t" without
knowledge of the true facts concerning Douglas' financial condition. When the situation became public, the price of Douglas'
common stock began to drop suddenly to plaintiffs' detriment. The
five individuals who purchased without knowledge of the material inside information brought suit against Merrill Lynch, its employees, and the customers who had received information from
Merrill Lynch.' 2 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants owed a duty to
disclose to the investing public the material inside information
relating to Douglas' earnings; that defendants perpetrated a fraud
on plaintiffs through their failure to disclose such information;
that plaintiffs would not have purchased Douglas stock had they
known the information withheld by defendants; and that plaintiffs
3
were substantially damaged by defendants' actions.'
An interlocutory order was entered in the southern district of
New York denying defendants' motion for judgment on the
s Id. Those preferred customers included: Investors Management Co., Inc.; Madison
Fund, Inc.; J. M. Hartwell & Co.; Hartwell Associates; Park Westlake Associates; Van Strum
and Towne, Inc.; Fleschner, Becker Associates; A. W. Jones & Co.; A. W. Jones Associates;
City Associates; Fairfield Partners; Burden Investors Services, Inc.; and William A. M.
Burden & Co. Id.
For a discussion of disclosure responsibilities see 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
F urD--SEC RULE lOb-5, § 7.5(3)(d) (1973) (hereinafter cited to as A. BROMBERG). The
courts have adopted a policy of insuring that material undisclosed corporate information is
not transmitted for personal (noncorporate) purposes. Id. The policy, however, is not
violated if the information is transmitted for corporate purposes. Thus, use of material
undisclosed information by an underwriter in making a securities offering is not a violation.
Id. See also Arnold, Guidelinesfor the Banker "Insider" or "Tippee":, The Texas Gulf and Merrill
Lynch Decisions, 86 BANK. L.J. 319 (1969); Harfield, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Bank Internal
Procedures between the Trust and Commercial Departments, 86 BANK. L.J. 869, 872-73 (1969).
9 Short sales are the sales of borrowed stock in exchange for money. See Fowler, How
the Bears Operate, in THE ANATOMY OF WALL STREET 36-37 (1968).
10 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 232 (2d Cir.
1974).
" Id. at 232-33. Plaintiff Gibson purchased Douglas stock on June 23, prior to the
public release on June 24. The other four plaintiffs-Maurice Shapiro, Isadore Shapiro,
Naigles and Saxe-purchased stock on the 24th, without knowledge of the adverse information released by Douglas that day. Id.
12 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
'3 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 233 (2d Cir.
1974).
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pleadings.1 4 The Second Circuit, in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., ' 5 affirmed the district court decision and, in so
doing, addressed the issue of the liability of non-trading "tippers"
and trading "tippees"'1 6 under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193417 and the Securities Exchange Commission's
(SEC) rule l0b-5 i' promulgated thereunder. The Second Circuit
not only found the defendants in violation of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 but, more significantly, established a precedent for holding
defendants liable in a private action to all persons
who, during the same period.., purchased Douglas stock in the
open market Without knowledge of the material inside information which was in the possession of defendants. 19
14 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 268

(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
'5 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
16 The term "tipper" refers to the party who transmits the information and the term
"tippee" refers to the party who receives it. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 8, at § 7.5(1). While
tipping has not yet been legally defined, it is generally regarded as the "selective disclosure
of material inside (nonpublic) information for" personal gain. Id. § 7.5(2). Disclosure of the
information for corporate purposes is not tipping unless there is reason to believe that the
recipient will utilize the information for personal gain. Id.
17 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Section 10 provides in
pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contrivention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Is 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
19 495
F.2d at 241 (footnote omitted). In determining materiality, the courts have
generally applied the equivalent of the reasonable man test. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462
(2d Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963). In Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), a case involving a misleading proxy solicitation, the
Court stated:
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to be
"material," ... that determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the
defect was of such a character that it might have been considered important by a
reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote.
Id. at 384 (footnote omitted).
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Shapiro thus offers an affirmative response to the question of
whether those who selectively divulge material non-public corporate information and those who trade on national stock exchanges
or over-the-counter on the basis of such information are civilly
liable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
In developing the substantive law of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5, courts are faced with the problem of defining the nature
and extent of the protections created. The basic purpose of both
the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act was
to preserve the integrity of the securities markets and to restore
investors' confidence. 20 An important objective of the 1934 Act, as
set forth in section 10(b), is to ensure that access to material
information be enjoyed equally. 2' The broad and sweeping language of section 10(b) allows great flexibility in the implementation
of rule lOb-5, but also creates problems of uncertainty with respect
to the specific activities proscribed by the Act and with regard to
liability for violations of the Act. 2 2 In the absence of explanatory
legislative material regarding the particular congressional purpose
of section 10(b), 21 case law has, of necessity, served to define the
24
parameters of that section and rule lOb-5.
20

For a discussion of the background leading to the enactment of this legislation see

J.

GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH, 1929 (1955); R. SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD: A HISTORY OF THE
NEW YORK STOCK MARKET (1965).
2' The justification for section 10(b) was stated in the committee report accompanying

the bill:
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value
of the securities he buys or sells. The idea of a free and open public market is built
upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price
of a security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as
possible a just price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function
of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs
the operation of the markets as indices of real value. There cannot be honest
markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the
market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
" Although there is an abundance of material which attempts to define section 10(b),
the interpretations of the section are often conflicting. Compare Joseph, Civil Liability Under
lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171 (1964) with Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule l0b-5:
Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
2" An administrative spokesman who assisted in drafting the bill testified at a legislative
hearing that "[slubsection [(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.' " 6 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3528 (1969) (quoting from Stock Exchange Regulation, in

Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (remarks of Thomas Corcoran)). On the basis of this remark
the section has sometimes been regarded as an "acknowledged catchall." I A. BROMBERG,
supra note 8, at § 2.2(332).
" For a discussion of the limits of rule lOb-5 see Painter, Inside Information: Growing
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Underlying the decisional law delineating the scope of rule
lOb-5 is a recognition that selective use or disclosure of material
inside information for personal gain is inimical to the intent of the
securities legislation. 2 5 Consequently, a theme common to many
lOb-5 cases is the inherent unfairness of a so-called insider buying
securities from or selling to a second party ignorant of the
privileged information. 28 Although rule lOb-5 does not specifically
refer to "insiders," the courts have traditionally applied the term to
corporate officers and directors,2 7 and controlling shareholders.28
The boundaries of the definition, however, need not end there, as
to look for "boxes in organizational charts, or other well-defined
relationships" is to misconceive the meaning of the word.2 9
The willingness of the court to expand the traditional limits of
the insider class is represented by In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 30 a case
in which a partner in the broker-dealer firm of Cady, Roberts &
Co. received information from a director of the Curtiss-Wright
Corporation prior to its public release. Utilizing this information,
the partner undertook transactions in Curtiss-Wright stock. a In
holding the partner liable, the SEC relied on the presumed intent
of lOb-5 to include within its scope the actions of "any person" and
fashioned an "access test" which effectively imposed liability upon
any investor trading on the basis of material inside information.
The reasoning for extension of liability to such traders was set
forth by the Commissioner:
We have already noted that the anti-fraud provisions are
phrased in terms of "any person" and that a special obligation
has been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g.,
officers, directors and controlling stockholders. These three
Painsfor the Development of FederalCorporationLaw Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361

(1965); Note, SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 860 (1972).
25 It has been argued, however, that tipping is desirable as a mechanism for marketing
and exchanging inside information. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
26 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
92,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
27 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73
F. Supp. 798, modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
28 See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
29 Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. L.
731, 739 (1968).
30 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31 Id. at 909.
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groups, however, do not exhaust the classes of persons upon
whom there is such an obligation. Analytically, the obligation
rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness
involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. 2

-

The justification for expanding the insider class was succinctly set
forth in the Cady, Roberts decision in which it was stated that
"[n]either the statutes nor Rule 10b-5 establish artificial walls of
responsibility. ' 3 3 Although Cady, Roberts involved only a disciplinary action by the SEC, the underlying reasoning would seem to
lend itself to private civil actions as well.
The "access test" of Cady, Roberts was adopted by the Second
Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (TGS), 3 4 an injunctive
action brought by the SEC in April, 1965.35 In 1959 Texas Gulf
Sulphur located potentially valuable mineral deposits in Timmons,
Ontario. The favorable results of a drilling at the Timmons site in
late 1963 remained a closely guarded secret while the company
acquired the land and made further drillings to verify the results
of the first drilling. Various officers, directors and employees of
the company, knowing this information and the fact that it was not
public, subsequently bought shares on the open market, bought
calls on company shares, received stock options by the company
and advised their friends to buy. 6 When rumors of the discovery
began circulating, Texas Gulf Sulphur issued a press release on
April 12, 1964, stating that the drillings had been inconclusive,
"but the statements made by many outside quarters are unreliable
and include information and figures that are not available to
TGS. 3 7 Four days later the company announced a major discovery
and the price of the stock rose rapidly. The SEC then brought suit
against Texas Gulf Sulphur and several of its officers, directors
3 8
and employees, alleging violations of lOb-5.
32 Id.

at 912 (footnote omitted). See generally Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities

Exchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 121 (1962).

33 40 S.E.C. at 913.
34 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
31 401 F.2d at 839. For a comprehensive examination of the TGS decision and its
subsequent impact see Bromberg, supra note 29; Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate
Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271

(1965).
36 401 F.2d at 843-44.

17 Id. at 845.
38 Id. at 839. The complaint alleged that (1) defendants Darke, Fogarty, Mollinson,
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In assessing the liability of each of the defendants, the court
applied the "access test" of Cady, Roberts, declaring it to be the
"essence" of rule 1Ob-539 The court went further and indicated
that anyone who possesses material inside information would be
considered an "insider" and therefore must
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from
disclosing it .

. .

must abstain from trading in or recommending

the securities
concerned while such inside information remains
40
undisclosed.

In so holding, the court adopted the policy that all investors shall
"have relatively equal access to material information

'4 1

and that

they "should have equal access to the rewards of participation in
securities transactions .
4 2
risks."

. .

. [and] be subject to identical market

The TGS decision provided a waymark for securities actions in
holding tipping a violation of rule 10b-5. 4 3 However, the court did
not limit its consideration to the question of tipping per se. It went
further and indicated that a tipper could be held vicariously liable
for the trades of the tippees and their tippees.4 4 Although not
confronted with the question of tippee liability, the court did suggest that tippees might be held liable for violations of the rule. The
court observed that although
Huntington, Murray and O'Neill had purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock or calls thereon
on the basis of material inside information; (2) defendants Darke and Coates had disclosed
that information to others or had recommended purchase of Texas Gulf Sulphur stock
while the inside information was not publicly available; (3) defendants Stephens, Fogarty,
Mollinson, Holyk and Kline had accepted stock options without disclosing the material inside
information to the Stock Option Committee or to the Board of Directors of Texas Gulf
Sulphur; and (4) the Texas Gulf Sulphur press release of April 12, 1964 was misleading. Id.
at 839-42.
39 Id. at 848.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42

Id. at 851-52. For arguments critical of the policy statements announced in TGS see

H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Ruder, Corporate Disclosures
Required by the FederalSecurities Laws: The Codificatign Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw.
U.L. REv. 872 (1967).
43 401 F.2d at 852. The tipping violation applied to defendant Darke, a Texas Gulf
Sulphur geologist, who had informed certain people that the company's stock was a "good
buy" and had given them information regarding the results of the test drillings. Id.
44 Id. at 856 n.23. This ruling applied to defendant Coates, a Texas Gulf Sulphur
director, who not only purchased company stock for himself, but also advised his son-in-law,
a broker, of the material information, The son-in-law subsequently made purchases for
himself and certain customers. Id.
See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 8, at § 7.5(4). The author points out that if the overriding
policy of rule lOb-5 is to prevent inequities in the market, it would be served by holding
original tippers liable, even for trades by tippees. Such extensive liability, he maintains,
would "operate as a powerful deterrent to tipping." Id. (footnote omitted).
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we need not decide whether, if they [the tippees] acted with
actual or constructive knowledge that the material inside information was undisclosed, their conduct is as equally violative of
the Rule as the conduct of their insider source... we note that it

45
certainly could be equally reprehensible.

This statement carried a forewarning that the "access test" would
be equally applicable to tippees who might be considered insiders if
46
they possess material inside information.
Ross v. Licht, 4 7 a private civil action, seems to hold that rule
lOb-5 applies to tippees. In that case, the court imposed liability on
purchasers of shares in a privately held company who made their
transactions using material inside information of a planned public
offering by the company at a much higher price. 48 The group of
purchasers included three dentists, one of whom was the brother
of the president of the corporation. It was the intention of these
buyers to resell some of their shares to the corporate insiders
under the pretense that they had asked to have their commitment
49
reduced.
The court first held the purchasers liable as "insiders, '50 but
went on to qualify that holding by declaring that "[i]f [they] were
not insiders, they would seem to have been 'tippees'

. .

. and subject

to the same duty as insiders. '51 Apparently believing that a finding
of liability based on the fact that defendants were either insiders or
tippees rested on a rather shaky foundation, the court set forth an
alternate basis upon which liability could be imposed saying that
"in any event, [the purchasers] would be equally liable with the
other defendants for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule
lOb-5. ' '5 2 But, as one commentator has suggested, it is precisely the
comprehensiveness of the holding of liability that undermines Ross'
precedential value. 53 The court's equivocation in holding the defendants liable on three separate grounds makes Ross a dubious
45 401 F.2d at 853.
46 One court has stated that "tippees ...present the same threat to the investing public

as do insiders themselves." Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1969).
See Bromberg, supra note 29, at 749, for a discussion of suggested criteria for determining
tippee responsibility. See also Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur-Its Holdings and Its Implications, 22
VAND. L. Rav. 359, 378 (1968).
11 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
48 Id. at 411.
49 Id. at 398, 401.
50 Id. at 409.
5' Id. at 410.
52 Id.
53 Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule lOb-5, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 55, 65-66.
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authority for holding tippees in violation of rule 10b-5 in subsequent suits. 54
Although important strides toward defining tipper and tippee
liability in lOb-5 actions were made by Cady, Roberts, TGS and Ross,
those cases did not determine all of the circumstances under which
such liability could be imposed. Two subsequent cases, In re Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 55 and In re Investors Management
Co., 56 both involving the same fact situation as Shapiro, further

expanded the limits of tipper-tippee liability under rule 10b-5.
In re Investors Management Co. firmly established the precedent
of tippee liability, adopting the TGS suggestion that actions of
tippees were as reprehensible as the action of their tippers. 5 7 The
case was a 1970 SEC disciplinary proceeding against a preferred
customer of Merrill Lynch who sold Douglas stock after having
been advised by Merrill Lynch of Douglas' deteriorating economic
condition. The hearing examiner in Investors Management held that
remote tippees are subject to the same rule 10b-5 restrictions as are
traditional insiders. 58 The full Commission subsequently affirmed

the decision which required, as a basis for tippee liability, merely
the actual or constructive knowledge that the material inside information emanate from a corporate source. 5 9 Thus, the SEC
adopted a standard that rejected the "relationship giving access"
test of Cady, Roberts. Although the requisite relationship could
undoubtedly have been found between Douglas and Merrill Lynch,
as well as between Merrill Lynch and the respondents, the Commission presumably realized that future efforts to impose tippee
liability would often be thwarted by a rule which predicated the
finding of such liability on the existence of some traditional
association. 60
-4 Id. It should be noted that the purchasers in Ross were obviously more than mere
tippees. Their participation in the scheme to buy and resell the stock clearly inculpated them
in the fraud upon the plaintiff. Hence, Ross' precedential value in holding tippees liable is
further weakened. Id.
5 [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,629 (SEC 1968).
56 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,832 (SEC 1970), affd,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,163 (SEC 1971).
11 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,163, at 80,521. See generally
Rapp & Loeb, supra note 53; Comment, Investors Management Company and Rule J OB-5-The
Tippee at Bay, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 545 (1972); Comment, Investors Management: Institutional
Investors as Tippees, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 502 (1971); Note, Deterrence of Tippee Trading Under
Rule lOb-5, 38 U. CI. L. Rpv. 372 (1971).
58 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,832, at 83,939.
59 Id. at 83,940.
11 Comment, Investors Management Company and Rule JOB-5-The Tippee at Bay, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 545, 551 (1972). For a discussion of the reasons the SEC abandoned its
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In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. was an SEC
disciplinary action brought to rebuke Merrill Lynch for allowing
the adverse information received by its investment banking group
on Douglas Aircraft Corporation to be used to the benefit of some
of the institutional clients of the brokerage group. 61 The Commission, in holding Merrill Lynch in violation of the securities laws,
recognized that tipping is a violation of rule lOb-5 not only if done
by traditional insiders (directors, officers, and controlling
shareholders), but also by anyone having access to corporate
information. 62 Citing Cady, Roberts, the court noted that there is an
inherent unfairness involved whenever a corporate outsider is
given and trades on, or causes others to trade on, such informa63
tion, knowing it is unavailable to the investing public.
A logical deterrent to those who trade or cause others to trade
on the basis of inside information is the imposition of personal
liability. 64 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., di"access test" in favor of one requiring only actual or constructive knowledge see id. at
550-55.
61 [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

77,629, at 83,348-49. For a

discussion of the special responsibilities of the banker see Arnold, supra note 8.
62 In re Merrill Lynch is distinguishable from Cady, Roberts principally on the basis of the
fact that the Commission in the latter case merely felt compelled "to identify those persons
who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs." Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). There was no indication that "any person" in
possession of material information was under an obligation to disclose or abstain from
trading.
77,629, at 83,349.
63 [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
64 Neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 explicitly provides for a private cause of action
for violation of their provisions. Civil liability was initially and remains based on an implied
right of recovery. For a discussion of implied remedies see 1 A. BROMBERC, supra note 8, at §
2.4; Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1152-53
(1965); Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The Codification
Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 872, 877-79 (1967).
The question of whether Congress intended to create in section 10(b) a civil remedy at
all has generated much disagreement. See sources cited in note 22 supra. Nevertheless, it is
clear that an implied right of action does exist. The first reported civil action based upon
rule lOb-5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946) (motion to dismiss),
73 F. Supp. 798, modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In finding a buyer liable in a
private action for injury to the seller, the court based the implied right of action on two
distinct grounds. First, the court stated that "[t]he disregard of the command of a statute is a
wrongful act and a tort." 69 F. Supp. at 513. Second, the court relied upon section 29(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act read in conjunction with the 1938 amendment to that section.
The 1938 amendment dealt with actions maintained in reliance upon section 29(b) and
indicated to the court "that Congress meant the original statute to be interpreted as providing for civil suits under it." Id. at 514.
The existence of a private cause of action is well established not only with respect to the
right of recovery by a defrauded seller, but also with respect to cases allowing recovery by a
defrauded buyer. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Miller v. Bargain
City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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rectly holds that parties suffering injury as a consequence of the
informational abuses of tippers and their tippees may recover in a
private civil action. 6 5 The court recognized that there was no
justification for limiting relief to injunctive or disciplinary actions
initiated by the SEC. In permitting plaintiffs to recover in a private
civil action, the court noted that it was the intent of Congress that
the antifraud legislation be construed liberally to give effect to its
66
remedial objective.
In broadening the liability to which tippers and tippees may be
subject, Shapiro relied chiefly on the "disclose or abstain" rule
enunciated in TGS. 67 The defendants, however, argued that TGS
ought not be the controlling precedent in this case. First, defendants asserted that Shapiro was distinguishable from TGS in that
Shapiro was not an injunctive action but rather a private damage
action, 6 8 and second, that rule 10b-5 imposed no duty to disclose
material inside information to any purchaser not involved in a
69
face-to-face transaction with the seller.
The court responded to defendants' first argument that TGS
was not applicable by stating that the purpose of section 10(b), that
all material information be available to traders on a relatively equal
basis, would be frustrated if the "disclose or abstain" rule set forth
65 495 F.2d at 241. The question of whether tippers are subject to civil liability was
affirmatively answered in Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 315 F.
Supp. 42 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
874 (1973). In Financial, a case based upon the same facts as Shapiro, a mutual fund
management group brought an action for unlawful manipulation of the price of Douglas
stock and for illegal use of inside information in connection with the sale of that stock. On a
motion for summary judgment, the court held with respect to the first charge that
since private actions under Rule 1Ob-5 are in large part governed by the same tort
principles applicable to fraud, intent to defraud or its equivalent, or at least knowledge- that statements disseminated to the public are false or misleading, must
appear from the evidence in order to make out a violation.
315 F. Supp. at 44 (emphasis in original). Regarding the second charge, the court stated that
"[i]t is doubtful that tipping which results in insider trading on a national exchange can
support a private action for damages under lOb-5." Id.
After denial of motion for summary judgment, the Financial case continued to trial
where the jury found both McDonnell Douglas and Merrill Lynch in violation of rule lOb-5.
The jury considered the issues of liability for both the unlawful price manipulation and
tipping and found the defendants guilty. 474 F.2d at 515. However, as no interrogatories
were submitted to the jury, it is impossible to determine whether the liability of Merrill
Lynch, the tipper, was based on price manipulation or tipping. See Rapp & Loeb, supra note
53, at 79. Thus, Financial is of little precedential value.
66 495 F.2d at 235.

61 Id. at 236.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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in TGS were limited to injunctive actions. ° In rejecting defendants'
second contention, the court declared that it would
make a mockery of the "disclose or abstain" rule if we were to
permit the fortuitous matching of buy and sell orders to determine whether a duty to disclose had been violated. 7 1
Neither was the court persuaded by defendants' argument that
"effective public disclosure . . . about a company with which they
were not associated ' 72 was not possible for "the duty imposed is not
a naked one to disclose, but a duty to abstain from trading unless
they do disclose. '7 3 In disposing of defendants' arguments, the
court found both Merrill Lynch, the non-trading tipper, and the
selling defendants, the trading tippees, in violation of the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws. 7 4 Specifically, Merrill Lynch violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 by disclosing material inside
information to the institutional investor tippees. But for the disclosure of that inside information the tippees would not have sold
their stock and plaintiffs could not have attributed their losses to
any action of the defendants. The selling defendants breached
their duty to the investing public when they traded on the basis of
inside information. In imposing liability on the defendants, the
Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages claimed for injuries sustained as a result of defendants' conduct, and thus firmly established tipper-tippee liability in private
civil actions.
As a necessary condition to widening the scope of liability, the
court was compelled to discuss certain elements on which a private
lOb-5 cause of action for tipping violations may be maintained.7 5
Among the most readily perceived of these elements is the requirement that there be some link between defendant's behavior
and plaintiff's injury. The courts have consistently held that causation, as evidence of such a link, is an essential element of a private
action for damages under rule lOb-5.7 6 Case law reveals that the
Id.
Id.
72 Id. at 237-38.
73 Id. at 238.
74 Id.
75 The defendants' primary emphasis on appeal was on the alleged absence of the
elements of causation, reliance and privity between plaintiffs and defendants. Id. at 238-40.
However, they had argued the absence of other elements of a rule lOb-5 cause of action in
the district court-standing, materiality and scienter. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 270-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
" Although rule lOb-5 does not specifically mention causation, it has been suggested
70

71
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standard of causation has evolved from the rather inflexible proximate cause test to a more relaxed causation in fact test which is
capable of application in a variety of situations. 7"
The Second Circuit confronted the problem of causation in
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 78 a case involving the alleged
omission of material facts from an offering circular, and adopted a
proximate cause test. The court, in articulating the nature of the
test, said:
"[T]he plaintiff is required to prove by a fair preponderance
of the evidence that he or she suffered damages as a proximate
result of the alleged misleading statements and purchase of stock
in reliance to them. In other words, the plaintiff must show that
the misleading statement or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or causing the damage suffered by him or her
or a reasonably
and that the damage was either a direct result ' 79
foreseeable result of the misleading statement.
The Second" Circuit implicitly relaxed the test of proximate
causation a year later in affirming the district court decision in
Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,8 0 a case which involved nondisclosure by a broker-dealer to a stock purchaser of his role as a
that the phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970), is the source of the requirement. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 8, at § 8.7(1). It has also
been suggested that the requirement is derived from the Securities Exchange Act § 28(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78bb (1970): "[N]o person ...shall recover.., a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of." (Emphasis added). See 2 A. BROMBERG, Supra.
One of the first cases dealing with the question of causation was Barnett v. Anaconda
Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), in which it was stated that in order to sustain a claim
under section 10(b) there must be "at least some 6ausal relationship to the damage complained of." Id. at 775 (footnote omitted). Barnett dealt with the issue of a misleading proxy
statement and involved both sections 14(a) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. The
court in Barnett did not determine whether the necessary causal connection was one of
proximate cause since no causal connection had been alleged. It did, however, indicate that a
violation allows the damaged party to recover " 'any loss proximately resulting therefrom.' "
Id. at 775 n.6 (quoting from Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1956)). See 2 A.
BROMBERG, supra at § 8.7; 6 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 3880-83; Note, supra note 24, at
892-99.
" See text accompanying notes 78-87 infra. Prior to adoption of the "causation in fact"
test, it had been unclear how proximate the causation must be, or whether proximate cause
was necessary at all. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (causation considered in conjunction with element of reliance);
Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524, 530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (causation considered as an
independent element); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701,
706-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) 'per curiam' (causation merged
with element of privity); 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 8, at § 8.7(1) (causation merged with
element of materiality).
78 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,-397 U.S. 913 (1970).
19 418 F.2d at 1291 (quoting from trial court's instructions to the jury).
80 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970), affg 305 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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market-maker. The district court found that the market-maker
position was a material fact which should have been disclosed, but
merely required that the defendant be shown to have engaged in a
violation of rule lOb-5, that the plaintiff be shown to have relied on
that violation, and finally, that the loss be shown to have resulted
therefrom."' The circuit court, explicitly defined this requirement
of reliance when it said that
[t]o the extent that reliance is necessary for a finding of a lOb-5
violation in a non-disclosure case8 2 such as this, the test is properly
one of tort "causation in fact."
The standard of causation in fact was subsequently adopted by
the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.8 3 In that
case the plaintiffs, holders of stock in the assets of the Ute Tribe,
deposited their shares in the First Securities Bank. Two employees
of the bank, in arranging for sale of this stock to non-members of
the tribe, failed to disclose material information regarding their
position as market-makers and the true value of the shares.8 4 The
Court held that
[u]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose . . . .[a]ll that is necessary is that the facts
withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of this
decision 85
In establishing a basis for this holding, the Court examined the
congressional philosophy and purpose sought by the passage of
section 10(b) and concluded that
the 1934 Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace a
"fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.""6
The Court, construing the securities regulation flexibly as Congress
intended, reasoned that the "obligation to disclose and [the] withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of causa87
tion in fact.
305 F. Supp. at 496.
438 F.2d at 1172 (quoting from Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d
787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969)).
11
82

83

406 U.S. 128 (1972).

Id. at 144-47.
s Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 151 (quoting from SEC v. Cdpital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963)) (footnote omitted).
87 406 U.S. at 154.
84
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Utilizing the standards set forth in Affiliated Ute, the Second
Circuit in Shapiro found that the necessary causation in fact had
been established
by the uncontroverted facts that defendants traded in or recommended trading in Douglas stock without disclosing material
inside information which plaintiffs as reasonable investors might
have considered88 important in making their decision to purchase
Douglas stock.

In no way did the actions of Merrill Lynch and the institutional
investors cause, in the sense of proximate causation or cause and
effect, either the fall in price of Douglas stock or the capital losses
suffered upon that fall. What their actions did do was to change
the identity of some of the stockholders who suffered the capital
loss. Thus, the court interpreted their actions as the cause in fact of
the losses suffered by the plaintiffs in Shapiro.
Shapiro is arguably distinguishable from Affiliated Ute since the
latter involved a face-to-face transaction whereas the transactions
in Shapiro took place on a national securities exchange where
buyers and sellers typically remain anonymous. Nevertheless, the
court in Shapiro refused to restrict the rule of causation in fact to
direct transactions saying that the "rule is dependent not upon the
character of the transaction . . . but rather upon whether the

defendant is obligated to disclose the inside information. '8 9 This
holding was declared consonant with the underlying purpose of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 which is "'to insure fairness in securities transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face,
over the counter, or on the exchanges.' "90
To buttress their argument that there was an absence of causation, defendants contended that (1) plaintiffs were not in privity of
contract with defendants and (2) plaintiffs, who thus had no prior
or contemporaneous knowledge of defendants' transactions, would
have purchased their stock even if defendants had not sold theirs,
and therefore defendants did not induce plaintiffs to buy stock and
did not cause plaintiffs' damage. 9i In essence, the defendants
maintained that these elements of privity and reliance were two
distinct requirements that must be satisfied in order to find the
requisite causation. The court, however, found both assertions
untenable.
495 F.2d at 238.
89 Id. at 240.
88

90

Id. (quoting from SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir.

1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
91 495 F.2d at 238-39.
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Dismissing defendants' first assertion, the court held that
"privity between plaintiffs and defendants is not a requisite element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action for damages. ' 92 Although one
of the first cases addressing the question of privity as an element in
'93
a lOb-5 cause of action required at least "a semblance of privity,
that requirement has since been rejected. 94 In Iroquois Industries,
Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.,9 5 the Second Circuit determined that in
order to maintain a successful action under rule lOb-5 the transaction need not be between plaintiff and defendant, and that privity
between plaintiff and defendant is unnecessary. 9 6 As has been
noted, in lOb-5 actions "the fact that there is no privity of contract
does not amount to a fatal defect of proof, '9 7 and causation as an
element of a rule lOb-5 action can be established notwithstanding
lack of privity. 9 s Certainly, rejection of the privity requirement is
necessary if rule 10b-5 is to have any effect in an open market
situation. The SEC has observed that
[i]t would be anomalous indeed if the protection afforded by the
antifraud provisions were withdrawn from transactions effected
on exchanges, primary markets for securities transactions.99
Additionally, the defense in Shapiro contended that even if
privity is no longer required between plaintiff and defendant, it is
still necessary to show a connection between defendants' nondisclosure and plaintiffs' purchases, "in the sense that the former
induced the latter."1 ° Prior to Affiliated Ute the requisite connec92 Id.

at 239. See W.

PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING

112-15 (1968);

Ruder, Texas Guf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule I Ob-5 Purchase
and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 432-33 (1968); Comment, Civil Liability Under Section
10B and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestionfor Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 661-67
(1965).
" Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), affd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (per curiam).
'4 See, e.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 37-38 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
95 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969).
96 Id. at 968.
9' Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
9 Cases in the Second Circuit which have sustained claims under rule lOb-5 in which
there was no direct transaction between plaintiff and defendant include the following: Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 19691, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Vine
v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
11 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 (1961).
100495 F.2d at 239. For a discussion of "connection" in non-privity cases see SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 886-88 (2d Cir. 1968) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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tion was frequently stated in terms of causation and reliance. 0 1
The plain meaning of these words, however, was considerably
stretched in nondisclosure cases until finally the tests themselves
were abandoned by the courts. In considering the reliance element,
the Second Circuit in List v. Fashion Park, Inc.1 0 2 first defined
reliance and then offered an explanation for the requirement:
Insofar as is pertinent here, the test of "reliance" is whether "the
misrepresentation is a substantial factor in determining the
course of conduct which results in [the recipient's] loss." ... The

reason for this requirement, as explained by the authorities cited,
is to certify that the
conduct of the defendant actually caused the
a0 3
plaintiffs injury.

However, the court also said that the test of whether a factor
determined the course of conduct is "whether the plaintiff would
have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the
defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact.

10 4

Though the List court held reliance to be a separate element,
distinguishable from materiality, and necessary to prove causation,
the test for reliance enunciated by the court was almost identical to
a test of causation in fact. In applying the List test the plaintiff need
not actually rely on the nondisclosed information; it is sufficient if
his conduct would have been different in the presence of disclosure. Indeed, it seems meaningless to talk of reliance in cases of
nondisclosure that involve dealings on an anonymous exchange or
over-the-counter markets. The investor relies only on his evaluation of information that is publicly available; he does not rely on
the "omission of an individual whose identity is unknown to
him."10 5 Cases subsequent to List, recognizing the irrelevance of a
reliance requirement in nondisclosure situations, explicitly re10 6
placed it with the test of causation in fact.
See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266-68 (lst Cir. 1966); Janigan v.
Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 785-86 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
102 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
103 340 F.2d at 462 (quoting from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938)) (citations
101

omitted).
104 340 F.2d at 463.
105 Comment, Recent JudicialExtensions of SEC Rule lOb-5, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 934, 941
(1963).
106 Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), provided authority for
dispensing with the reliance requirement in nondisclosure cases. In that case, the court held:
Whatever need there may be to show reliance in other situations ... we regard it as
unnecessary in the limited instance when no volitional act is required and the result
of a forced sale is exactly that intended by the wrongdoer.. .. What must be shown
is that there was deception which misled [the plaintiff] and that this was in fact the
cause of plaintiff's claimed injury.
Id. at 635 (citations omitted).
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Two recent cases from the Second Circuit provided an indication that reliance is no longer an element which must be proven in
nondisclosure cases. In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,"0 7
the court held that "reliance is an element of causation which plays
little role in nondisclosure cases." ' 0 8 The Crane holding was reinforced by Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co. t" 9 In arriving at the
decision that the role of market-maker was a material fact which
should have been disclosed, the Chasins court depended on the test
for reliance used in Crane: "To the extent that reliance is necessary
. . . the test is properly one of tort 'causation in fact.' "110
In considering defendants' reliance argument, the court in
Shapiro regarded the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute as
controlling.' 1I Affiliated Ute presented a logical sequel to List, Crane
and Chasins in rejecting the view that reliance is a prerequisite to
recovery in a private damage action. Under the circumstances of
the Affiliated Ute case, involving a failure to disclose, all that was
required was that the undisclosed information "be material in the
sense that a reasonable investor might have considered [it] important in the making of this decision."' 12 In adopting the policy
articulated in Affiliated Ute, that the obligation to disclose and the
withholding of a material fact is sufficient to establish the requisite
causation in fact, the Shapiro court refuted all of defendants' arguments that causation was lacking and that consequently, they could
11 3
incur no civil liability.
Having found that all defendants were liable in a private
action for damages to all persons who purchased Douglas stock on
the open market without knowledge of the material inside
information, 4 the court of appeals left to the district court the
determination of the form of relief to be granted, including the
appropriate measure of damages.'15 In remanding the damages
107 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
10 Id. at 797. One court did require actual reliance upon defendant's silence. List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906, 911-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1965). This requirement was subsequently rejected upon appeal. 340 F.2d at 463.
109 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
11' Id. at 1172 (quoting from Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787,

797 (2d Cir. 1969)).
495 F.2d at 240.
112 406 U.S. at 153-54. Affiliated Ute expressly applied the causation in fact standard
"1

articulated by Justice Harlan in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). In that
suit, predicated on section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, the Court found reliance
unnecessary as a prerequisite to recovery in a private damage action. Id. at 384.
495 F.2d at 240-41.
114 Id. at 237.
"' Id. at 241-42. The court of appeals left to the district court another question relevant
"1
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issue the court noted that "the nature and character of the Rule
the extent of lialOb-5 violations committed may require limiting
' 16
defendants."'
of
class
either
on
imposed
bility
Because tipping cases are likely to involve open market trading
and large classes of plaintiffs, the precedent set by the holding in
Shapiro carries with it the potential for making a defendant's liability grossly disproportionate to his culpability. 1 7 The situation of
insider selling upon receipt of recently developed adverse information not yet in the public domain might be considered as an
example. At the same time the insiders are selling, other uninformed market participants will typically be selling from their positions as well, for reasons wholly unrelated to the new information.
There is, however, no useful way of distinguishing those who are
buying from the insider sellers and those who are buying from
uninformed sellers. Once the adverse information has been publicized and absorbed by the market a decline in corporate value will
have occurred. The result is a net transfer of capital from those
who bought prior to full public appreciation of the information to
those who sold out before full appreciation. Some part of the
capital transfer, that stemming from insider selling, was frauduto the form of relief to be granted, namely, whether the action is to be maintained as a class
action, and, if so, the limits of the class. Id.
The recent case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974), involving a class
action on behalf of odd-lot traders against brokerage firms for alleged violations of the
antitrust and securities laws, may have some effect in limiting recovery in Shapiro and future
civil actions brought for tipping violations. The Eisen Court required individual notice to
identifiable class members. Id. at 2152. Further, the Court held that the plaintiff was
required to bear the cost of notice to members of the class. Id. While the cost of notifying
each individual who bought or sold stock during the period in which defendants were
trading on the basis of material inside information may be prohibitive, nevertheless, it would
seem that inside traders may still face a proliferation of individual suits.
1I6 495 F.2d at 242. The court suggested certain questions which merited consideration
by the trial court in the determination of the appropriate form of relief, Among those
questions were
the extent of the selling defendants' trading in Douglas stock, whether such trading
effectively impaired the integrity of the market, what compensation if any was paid
by the selling defendants to Merrill Lynch for the inside information, what profits
or other benefits were realized by defendants, what expenses were incurred and
what losses were sustained by plaintiffs, and what should be the difference, if any,
in the extent of liability imposed on the individual defendants and the selling
defendants, respectively.
Id.
17 The precise calculation of damages caused by tippee trading is impossible due to the
complex nature of the market structure. For a discussion of the various formulae which have
been applied to assess damages in lOb-5 actions see Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual
Damages in Rule lOb-5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 651; Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule
lob-5 Cases Involving Actively TradedSecurities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371 (1974); Note, Measurement
of.Damages in Private Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 165.
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lently obtained, while the remainder, that stemming from uninformed selling, was fortuitous and clearly nonfraudulent. The
fraudulently obtained capital transfers may be but a small proportion of the total transfer, yet if the defendants in a tipping case are
held liable for the losses experienced by every person who bought
during the time the defendants were trading on the basis of their
information, then those defendants are effectively being held liable
for the total.
Insider trading in a case such as Shapiro will have no effect on
total capital transfers. Regardless of the utilization of such information the value of the stock will fall and someone will take a loss. Yet
it remains that inside trading does call for some kind of liability for
damages. The problem is in determining how far the liability of a
violator should extend in covering losses, not all of which he could
reasonably be said to have caused.
Perhaps the fairest solution to the problem of damages in such
a case would be to require a violator to pay all of his profits into a
fund which would be divided pro rata among all those plaintiffs
who transacted during the time the insiders were trading on
privileged information. Supporting this measure of damages is the
argument that there are some gains which were not fraudulently
obtained and yet contributed to the total losses suffered. It is
manifest that the defendant ought not be responsible for compensating that proportion of losses which derive from the nonfraudu1 18
lent gains.
Shapiro indicates that rule lOb-5 is becoming an important
instrument for compensating innocent buyers and sellers for injuries resulting from insider abuses. This development raises several problems. As has been noted, there appears to be no reasonable means of limiting the class of persons who should be allowed
to recover. Similarly, there are apparent difficulties in limiting the
class of defendants who will be liable. Finally, even if these problems are successfully resolved, there remains the equally difficult
question regarding the amount of damages.
118 Perhaps the two most significant effects of limiting liability in tipping cases are the
avoidance of unconscionably excessive damages and the elimination of the possibility of
reducing market liquidity. The latter effect flows from the former. Confronted with the
possibility of almost unlimited liability, a trader, contemplating a transaction on the basis of
newly acquired information, may withdraw from the market rather than run the risk of
having that information subsequently declared to be inside. This reluctance to trade could
result in less overall trading in the issue in question. As a consequence, buyers may not easily
find a seller and may have to pay a premium for the stock purchased. Likewise, sellers may
be unable to find a ready buyer and would be obliged to take a price cut. The net result is a
less efficient market.

206

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

The expansion of the scope of rule 10b-5 to include recovery
for tipping violations in civil actions raises serious doubts as to
whether an indefinite class of injured parties should be allowed
complete compensation with the possibility of extraordinarily great
liability. Rather than impose unconscionably excessive damages
upon those found to be in violation of the rule, compensation
should be strictly limited and the greatest emphasis should be
placed on injunctive proceedings," 9 disciplinary actions by the
SEC, 12° and criminal sanctions 21 in order to deter misconduct by
insiders.
Nancy Garbade
"9 Securities Exchange Act § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8u(e) (1970).
120 Id. §§ 15(b)(5), (7), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5), (7) (1970).
121 Id. § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970).

